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Research on Practical Rationality:
Studying the Justification of Actions in Mathematics Teaching
Patricio Herbst1
University of Michigan
&
Daniel Chazan
University of Maryland

Abstract: Building on our earlier work conceptualizing teaching as the management of
instructional exchanges, we lay out a theory of the practical rationality of mathematics
teaching—that is, a theory of the grounds upon which instructional actions specific to
mathematics can be justified or rebuffed. We do that from a perspective informed by what
experienced practitioners consider viable but also in ways that suggest operational
avenues for the study of instructional improvement, in particular for improvements that
enable students to do more authentic mathematical work. We show how different kinds of
experiments can be used to engage in theory building and provide examples of initial
work in building this theory.
Keywords: Mathematics instruction; Practical Rationality; Theory of teaching;
Teacher education
Introduction
In this paper we address the work of the mathematics teacher in instruction and
the rationality behind this work. We first sketch out how the teacher’s work
could conceivably contribute to the creation of opportunities for students to do
authentic mathematical work. In that sense we expect that the paper will add to
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Herbst & Chazan
our collective sense of what is conceivable and perhaps desirable to happen in
classrooms. Most of the paper, however, is concentrated on elaborating on the
grounds for possibility and justification of teachers’ actions. In particular, what is
the rationality that might (or might not) support teachers’ management of
authentic mathematical work by students?
In accounting for the rationality beneath teachers’ actions and in regard to the
possibility of enabling authentic mathematical work by students, we take some
distance from two relatively commonplace ways of responding to a vision
sketch. In one of these approaches, a vision of conceivable mathematical work in
classrooms might be followed by an acknowledgment and analysis of the forces
and structures that make the vision not viable. Such an approach would summon
us to be like social critics of the current educational system, and to endorse a new
educational system that would bring all our hopes to fruition. In the other
approach, the vision sketch is followed by a busy shaping of persuasive rhetoric,
design of efforts, and organization of resources, all of them aimed at making the
vision happen against all odds. Such an approach would summon us to be like
social engineers, relentlessly working to realize the vision, as if the only thing
that separated the conceivable from the viable was the existence of the will to
make the vision happen.
Without meaning to disrespect proponents of either of those approaches, we
take a third approach, which combines the orientation to improvement of the
second with the analytic disposition of the first but poses questions that call
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neither for critique nor for engineering but rather for theory and research. We
elaborate on the notion that the actions of teachers in classrooms are not mere
expressions of their free will and personal resources; rather their actions also
attest to adaptations to conditions and constraints in which they work. And yet
that realization does not necessarily condemn us to accept the status quo; rather,
it can suggest ways of working toward improvement in viable, incremental, and
sustainable ways.
How can we think about the distinction, and the gap, between what is
conceivable and what is viable in mathematics teaching? How can we find out
how much of the vision can be realized within existing conditions and
constraints? We argue below that what is required is first to understand and then
to co-opt what we have been calling the practical rationality of mathematics
teaching (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011). We first
recount how the story of practical rationality began and the big picture it serves.

How We Started Our Efforts to Explain Teaching
We started to work together back in 2000, following our common interest in
understanding the teaching of mathematics at the secondary level and our
shared sense of the importance of learning the wisdom of the practice (Shulman,
2004). But while the focus of our interest was convergent, our theoretical
perspectives and our methods required some work. Chazan had been doing
what Ball (2000) calls first-person research: He had been using his own practice
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teaching Algebra I to investigate the dilemmas and dynamics that a teacher
needs to manage (see Chazan, 2000; Chazan & Ball, 1999; also Lampert, 1985).
Herbst had been using the more structuralist notions of didactical contract
(Brousseau, 1997) and didactical transposition (Chevallard, 1985) to provide
detached observer descriptions and explanations of the work of teaching and its
effects on the classroom representation of knowledge (see Herbst, 1998; 1999;
2002a; 2002b). Our conversations at the time had found a good anchor concept in
Bourdieu’s (1998) notion of disposition: an element of practical reason that could
be conceived as having two sides, like a coin. Dispositions could be seen by an
observer as ordinances to which the individual is subject given the position in
which they are, but dispositions could also be experienced as tendencies
emanating from the individual and compelling them to act in particular ways
(see Herbst & Chazan, 2003; cf. how Lampert, 1985, speaks of commitments). Early
on the conversation was mostly theoretical, as we searched for ways to
complement our perspectives; but then our conversation took a methodological
turn.
At about the same time that we started talking about dispositions, the
educational research community was dealing with a renewed interest in the use
of experimental methods in education, which culminated with reports like
Shavelson and Towne (2002) and the establishment of the What Works
Clearinghouse
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The notion was in the air that educational
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research should aspire to the gold standard of using experimental design,
randomly assigning participants to conditions; and our conversations started to
include considerations of hypothesis testing in research on mathematics
teaching. As we considered what experimental research in mathematics
instruction could look like, it was odd to us that the image that first came to
mind was that of research on whether the implementation of an instructional
intervention might affect students’ performance: Does curriculum X produce
better gains than curriculum A on the scale N? To be clear, nothing is odd about
thinking of curriculum or pedagogy implementation in terms of experimental
research. What seemed odd to us was that those types of questions would appear
as the prototypical examples of how our field might take on the challenge of
experimental research.
Experimental research that gauged the achievement gains that could be
caused by a particular treatment were clearly worthwhile questions, important
for policy and practice, but they were also applied questions, not necessarily
illuminating the fundamental phenomena of mathematics instruction. We
wondered whether embracing an experimental paradigm would necessarily
mean that research on mathematics instruction would be limited to asking
questions of an applied nature, questions that took for granted that we knew the
nature of mathematics instruction well and just had to design and test ways of
improving it. Given our experience as classroom researchers, we knew that, at
the time, mathematics education research (for a long time focused on learning
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and the learner, and later on the individual teacher) still had some ways to go as
far as understanding the nature of the activity of mathematics teaching. We
thought there was a great need for basic (as opposed to applied) research on
mathematics teaching, not just basic research on students or teachers. And so we
wondered whether basic research on mathematics instruction had some use for
an experimental paradigm.
Instructional Situations and their Norms:
A Focus for Basic Research on Mathematics Teaching
The fundamental idea, proposed by David K. Cohen among others (see
Cohen, Raudenbush, and Ball, 2003; also Chevallard, 1985; Hawkins, 1974;
Henderson, 1963), that instruction consists of the interactions among teacher,
students, and content in environments was compelling to us and essential for
defining an emerging field. We pondered what basic research on the nature of
mathematics instruction could look like if it embraced an experimental
paradigm: What kind of interventions could reveal aspects of the nature of
mathematics instruction? And what aspects of mathematics instruction could we
expect to find out about? These questions seemed important, on the one hand, in
order to respond to the challenge of using an experimental paradigm. Those
questions seemed important, on the other hand, in order to establish a
foundation for basic (rather than applied) research on instructional practice in
mathematics--research that asked questions distinct from the study of instruction
writ large (which might assume that the subject does not matter or that it matters
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the same regardless of the particular discipline from which it comes) as well as
questions distinct from the study of people (teachers or students) which might
perpetuate the reduction of mathematics education research to psychology.
One key idea presented itself as an aspect of mathematics instruction that we
wanted to find out more about: If the subject matters in instruction, that is, if
mathematics instruction in geometry is a practice distinct from instruction say in
Calculus, American History, or Organic Chemistry, we would expect to see
regularities of some sort across different cases of instruction in a specific domain.
This was anchored by our mutual interest in justification and proof and our
question of why, while those practices were current in geometry, they continued
to be absent in algebra, in spite of calls for it in reports over the decades: How
could it be that the same teacher with the same class, but perhaps at one year’s
remove, would talk and act so differently in regard to the source of mathematical
truth simply due to a shift from geometry to algebra instruction? Additionally, if
the regularities observed concerned mathematics instruction as an activity, we
would expect to observe regularities that went beyond the knowledge being
transacted to include similar ways in which teacher and students managed those
knowledge transactions. The word “norm” used in the sociological sense as the
normal or unmarked behavior that is tacitly expected in a setting, suggested itself
as the name of the object of study. We hypothesized that instruction in specific
courses of mathematical study (algebra, geometry, etc.) could be described as
abiding by consistent sets of norms, much as other human practices like eating in
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a formal dinner or getting a table in a restaurant abide by consistent sets of
norms (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). And we thought that experimental research
could be used to confirm that those norms exist.
Instructional Situations, their Norms, and the Notion of Breaching Experiment
While the observance of norms could be found at various layers of classroom
activity (as we indicate below, in particular at the layer of the didactical contract
and the layer of the mathematical task), we concentrated on studying norms at
the layer that we’ve called the instructional situation (Herbst, 2006). Conceptually,
an instructional situation is a type of encounter where an exchange can happen
between (1) specific mathematical work done by students and their teacher in
moment-to-moment interaction and (2) a claim on students’ knowing of a
specific item of knowledge at stake. Intuitively one could think of an
instructional situation as including a mathematical task and the element of the
curriculum that the completion of the task enables the teacher to lay claim on.
We model instructional situations by spelling out norms that describe the
knowledge and the work being exchanged, who is expected to do what, and
when those different actions are supposed to happen (see Herbst & Miyakawa,
2008; Herbst, Chen, Weiss, & González, 2009).
Herbst’s own research studying the work of the teacher managing the
instructional situation of ‘doing proofs’ in high school geometry provided an
example of a norm: students are expected to justify a statement in a proof with a
reason before they move on to make the next statement. In proposing it as a
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norm, we did not mean to endorse the norm as appropriate, but to describe what
classroom participants—teacher and students—would consider appropriate. We
were not willing to posit that those norms would necessarily be explicit for
teachers or students: We expected that people might act as if they followed
norms but not necessarily bring them up if and when they were asked to
describe the activities they do. And we realized also that, unlike physical laws
those norms of human activity could not be thought of as inevitable; they could
in fact be broken—one could conceive of and actually find a teacher who had let
a student make a new statement without having justified the previous one. While
one would expect that a large number of observations of a similar instructional
situation would reveal compliance with norms more often than non compliance,
the notion that mathematics instruction is regulated by norms could not be
validated solely through the observation of regularities in action. We needed
empirical ways of attesting that even if a norm had actually been breached,
people familiar with the practice would have expected it to be fulfilled.
The notion that basic research on mathematics instruction could consist of
finding out about the norms of instruction in subject specific situations, along
with the particular notion of a norm as a tacit, shared expectation for action, led
us to an idea for how to pick up the challenge of doing experimental research.
We were inspired by the ethnomethodological notion of breaching experiments
(Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Mehan & Wood, 1975), which the first author was
already adapting for use in classroom research (Herbst, 2003, 2006). We thought
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this notion could be adapted to deliberately bring to the surface practitioners’
sense of the norms of instruction. If we could represent to practitioners (for
example, through a videotaped episode of instruction, but also possibly through
an animation or through a virtual reality experience) action that purported to be
of the same kind of what they would ordinarily do, but where a hypothesized
norm of that action had been breached, we might be able to hear from
practitioners whether they had expected the norm to hold. In that sense, a
representation of teaching that included the breach of a norm could be expected
to reproduce deliberately the phenomenon of interest, namely, that practitioners
expected that norm to hold. The extent to which those procedures could be called
experiments refers to Francis Bacon’s notion of experiment in scientific inquiry:
“there remains simple experience; which, if taken as it comes, is called accident,”
“if sought for, experiment” (cited in Durant, 1926, p. 146). That is, our earlier
conception of doing experimental research only abided by the notion of
experiment as the deliberate reproduction of a phenomenon. But one could also
see at least as a possibility that the modern conception of experiment, which
emphasizes reproduction of the phenomenon under controlled conditions by
way of random assignment of participants to conditions, could be used to
confirm that a norm holds: Imagine having two representations of teaching that
differed only in that in one of them (the control condition) a hypothesized norm
held while in the other (the treatment condition) the hypothesized norm has
been breached. Imagine a sample of practitioners who have a comparable degree
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of socialization in the practice where the norm is supposed to hold. Imagine
randomly assigning those participants to one or another representation. Imagine
having a way of gauging their satisfaction with the instruction experienced and
comparing both groups in regard to that assessment. That gave us a skeleton of
what basic experimental research on instruction could look like and some
impetus for initial work on a project that we would later call Thought
Experiments in Mathematics Teaching (ThEMaT).
Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching
The notions of instructional situation, norm, and breaching experiments led
us first to gather video records from a geometry lesson on proofs where the
teacher allowed a student at the board to omit the justification of a statement and
to move on with the proof. We started by gathering focus groups of geometry
teachers that looked at that video record and then examining the discourse of
those focus groups for comments that might provide evidence that teachers in
the focus groups had seen the actions of the videotaped teacher as breaching a
norm (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009; Weiss, Herbst, & Chen,
2009). At the same time that this work was being done we started exploring the
use of animations to represent classroom scenarios and we wrote a grant
proposal for Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching to the National
Science Foundation, asking for support to create animations that helped us study
what by then we had started calling the practical rationality of mathematics teaching.
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Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching (ThEMaT) was funded in
2004 and, among other things, it enabled us to create seventeen families of
animated classroom stories (the stories can be seen in LessonSketch,
www.lessonsketch.org). The animations use simple cartoon characters and voice
over to represent scenarios of classroom instruction. The use of animations
allowed us to control the content of those scenarios, allowing us to design
scenarios that breach a norm but comply with others. Animations also allowed
us to produce breaches that had not been observed in actual classrooms (thus
showing one important advantage over video records). And this media also
allowed us to create stories that branched, thus depicting alternative scenarios
that proceeded from a common trunk (thus our reference to families of stories,
since many of them have several alternative stories; see Chazan & Herbst, 2012;
Herbst, Chazan, Chen, Chieu, & Weiss, 2011; Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011).
The generous support of the National Science Foundation has been crucial for us
to maintain a research program that, in our view, has contributed to the field not
only an important technique for data collection but also some useful theoretical
and methodological ideas.
The goals of the research program are quite ambitious: To develop and test a
theory of the rationality of instructional practices in mathematics. This theory of
the rationality of instruction explains what instructional actions are justifiable by
drawing on two elements (1) the norms that the practice of teaching a particular
mathematics course imposes on whoever plays the role of teacher, and (2) the
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obligations that the profession of mathematics teaching requires of anybody
taking the position of mathematics teacher. Combined with the personal assets
(including knowledge, skills, and beliefs) that an individual teacher brings with
them to that position and that role, those norms and obligations can help explain
teacher action and decision-making. The project is now on its second funding
cycle in which we are designing and using an online interface (LessonSketch,
www.lessonsketch.org) to deliver online multimedia experiences that include
animations and other cartoon-based representations of teaching. The project
designs multimedia experiences and questionnaires that confront individuals or
groups of teachers with representations of teaching; the project will investigate
how responses to those questionnaires correlate with measures of mathematical
knowledge for teaching (MKT; Ball, Thames, & Phelps, 2008). Over the years,
project ThEMaT has allowed us not only to probe and ground our ideas about
norms and develop instruments but also to deepen the theory and make
progress, though we have not yet used an experimental paradigm in quite the
sense described above. Our interventions thus far are experiments in the sense
that they reproduce predicted phenomena (evidence of the breach of a norm),
but they have not yet reached the gold standard of controlled conditions by
random assignment. These conditions may be fulfilled through our current
efforts with LessonSketch: An authoring tool in the LessonSketch environment
allows us to create online multimedia experiences that may be randomly
assigned to participants (see Inglis & Mejía Ramos, 2009, for an example of a
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similar use of the internet in experimental research in mathematics education).
While the foregoing describes the story of our work, we use the following
sections to expand on the ideas and some of the methods.
Explicating Practical Rationality
A Classroom Scenario
Consider what we would call a thought experiment in mathematics
teaching. The action happens in a high school geometry course in late November.
The class has spent some time learning to use triangle congruence to prove
statements and has begun the study of quadrilaterals. The teacher, Mr. Jones,
has drawn a figure on the board (see Figure 1) and wants the class to prove a
statement about the relationship between the sides of the rectangle ABCD. There
is some hesitation. Somebody asks whether they could prove that AB is longer
than BC while another student asks what they have to go on; the teacher lets
those comments pass. A student asks whether triangles ADE and BCE are
congruent. Mr. Jones writes this question on the board and draws two arrows
from it. One arrow points toward a question he writes, “how would it help to
know that those triangles are congruent?” The other arrow points toward
another question he also writes, “what would you need to assume to be able to
say that those triangles are congruent?” You can hear somebody say that it’s
obvious that they are congruent while another says that they could then say the
triangles are isosceles. Another student says, “you’d need to know that AEB is a
right angle;” Mr. Jones writes this on the board and asks the class what they have
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to say about that (see Figure 2). Some students claim to not really know what the
teacher means with that question but others raise their hands. One of these
students says that she thinks it would be useful if the angle were right because
then the angles at the top would be congruent with the small angles at E. Some
kids perk up and one kid says, “and you could then say that AB is twice BC.”
The teacher asks them to take a few minutes and see if they can prove that the
ratio between the sides is 2 assuming as little as possible. You see a kid write,
“Prove: The ratio is 2 ” while others have written “Given:” and are pensive.

Figure 1. Mr. Jones diagram

Figure 2. Discussing given and prove

For a few years now, in the context of the project Thought Experiments in
Mathematics Teaching, we have been creating cartoon-based representations of
teaching that illustrate conceivable scenarios of instruction. One of them is the
story “A Proof about Rectangles,” a version of which we’ve just described. Now
we want to use that episode to raise a few questions about mathematics
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instruction in school classrooms and to elaborate on the ideas that this kind of
material has helped us explore.
Some of these questions concern the substance of this conceivable episode:
What opportunities for students’ mathematical work are made possible by how
the teacher has been managing the instruction? Other questions are about theory:
What kind of considerations about classroom instruction could help us describe
and explain how teacher and students ordinarily transact mathematical ideas, in
such a way that we could also account for possible avenues for improvement and
foresee their consequences? Finally, other questions are about research
methodology: What kind of data can help us ground those theoretical
considerations? How to obtain it? These questions, though large, serve to
explicate the program of research that we call the practical rationality of
mathematics teaching (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011).
Desirable and Customary Mathematical Work
What mathematical work are students doing in the episode described above?
We could describe it as listing plausible statements about a figure and
considering whether these plausible statements could be connected through
logical necessity. The source of some of those statements seems to be
perceptual—for example, the observation that angle AEB is right. Other
statements seem to result from deduction—notably, the observation that if the
angle AEB was right then one could conclude that side AB would be twice as
long as side BC . But regardless of the origin of each of those statements, the
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teacher is helping students connect all statements through abduction and
deduction: Asking what assumptions would enable one to infer the plausible
statement made and asking what inferences could be made if one took that
plausible statement for granted. The assertion about the relative length of the
sides of the rectangle eventually derives from the plausible truth of those earlier
statements. The teacher is thus helping students reduce a question of truth (what
could be true about an object) to a question of deducibility from possible
statements about an object. They are using proof as a method to find things out.
Such use of proof as method in knowledge inquiry is essential to the
discipline of mathematics (Lakatos, 1976). It is also behind the drive to
mathematically model other fields of experience: The expectation that in those
fields it will also be possible to reduce the problem of truth to a quest for
deducibility, which can then warrant new, still unknown, possible truths is
important in pure and applied science. Hanna & Jahnke (1996) have argued that,
by using an empirical theory to predict empirical phenomena, scientists engage
in modeling the world and deductively producing inferences based on
assumptions, predictions that are eventually subject to confirmation by
experimentation.
Being able to master such a form of inquiry can make a child resourceful in
ways that can add to methodological resources they get from the study of other
disciplines. Mathematical work of the kind depicted in the scenario is not only
authentic mathematical work (Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2009) but also embodies
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skills and processes that might empower students to contribute to knowledge
production writ large. In that sense we would argue that Mr. Jones’s questions to
students about what could be deduced from a given statement, or what
statement could entail what they think is true, are helpful ways of educating his
students in the use of mathematical reasoning for making predictions about the
world, in this case about the world of diagrams. A scenario where students could
work on connecting plausible statements deductively is therefore conceivable
and it could be represented using animations or comic strips with cartoon
characters.
However, it is likely the case that few students encounter such opportunities
to engage with proof in school mathematics in the way outlined by the foregoing
scenario. The work they do during their school years rarely includes chances to
acquire the skill or the appreciation of the methodological, model-making
function of proof or even experiences doing work that could have had that
exchange value.
It is more likely that the problem above would be presented to high school
geometry students as shown in Figure 3. In particular, while students are
ordinarily expected to prove propositions in high school geometry, it is
ordinarily the teacher (or the book) who will state the givens and the conclusion
of the propositions they prove. While efforts to change these norms have been
made (e.g., the work with the Geometric Supposers reported in Schwartz,
Yerushalmy, & Wilson, 1993), it rarely falls on the students to determine the
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givens for a plausible conclusion, to deduce the conclusion from a set of givens,
or to find both the givens and the conclusion for a theorem that relates to some
plausible naïve conjecture.
•Given:
ABCD rectangle,
E midpoint of DC ,
AEB right angle
Prove:

AB
2
BC

Figure 3. A more likely proof problem.

The Scenario as an Example of Norms and Instructional Situations
The expectation that, if students are to be held accountable for producing a
proof, the teacher will have to provide for them the givens and the “prove”
statement is an example of what we call a norm of the instructional situation
“doing proofs.” It is a norm in the sense that an observer can describe teachers
and students acting as if they expected that this would be the case. In
consequence, if students and teacher were involved in an interaction about a
problem for which the teacher did not provide the given and the “prove”, then it
is likely that neither teachers nor students would describe those activities as
doing proofs—they might describe them as something else (e.g., having a
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discussion). The norm is that anytime the students are expected to produce a
proof, teachers are expected to provide the givens and the conclusion to prove.
Of course by “norm” we don’t mean ‘the correct thing to do’; it is certainly not
“correct” from our perspective informed by our understanding of mathematical
practice, though it may be experienced as correct or appropriate by teachers and
students. We use “norm” and “normative” in two complementary senses: First,
the sense in which ‘normative’ means ‘frequent’ or ‘usual;’ this could be
corroborated empirically by observing, over a large number of high school
geometry classrooms, the recurrence of this feature in proof activity. Second, the
sense in which the participants in the situation act as if they expected such
behaviors to be appropriate or correct.
Such norms are not just arbitrary belief systems, idiosyncratic and completely
changeable; they are norms of interaction between teacher, students, and specific
content and are thus ascribed not to individuals but to the specific instructional
situation where that interaction happens. They have a particular purpose; they
regulate the division of labor over time between student and teacher vis-à-vis a
specific kind of instructional exchange. In this case, this norm regulates the
exchange between the work students do when proving a proposition and the
claim (that the teacher needs to substantiate in high school Geometry) that
students know how to do proofs. In that sense, this norm is different in scope
than the more general norms of the didactical contract, which are present across
different instructional exchanges (e.g., the expectation that when the teacher asks
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students a question, she already knows the answer). In trying to understand the
practical rationality that underlies that norm and the possibilities to depart from
it we are therefore asking not a question about instruction in general (e.g., Do
teachers see it as possible, desirable, or appropriate to have students work on
tasks where they determine the givens or the goal?) but rather a question about
what counts as doing a proof in high school geometry: Do teachers see it as
possible, desirable, or appropriate to hold students accountable for doing a proof
and to do so in the context of tasks where students are in charge of providing the
givens or the conclusion of the proof problem? To us it seems that such tasks
would enable students to experience and learn about the methodological role of
proof: Its instrumentality in finding new knowledge. But, such tasks are not
common in classrooms.
“Doing proofs” in high school geometry illustrates what we mean by an
instructional situation. These are frames for the encounter among teacher,
students, and specific content: In these encounters an instructional exchange
takes place—the exchange between the work that students do, for example, on a
particular task, and the knowledge claim that such work enables the teacher to
make by virtue of having done that work. Instructional situations can be
modeled as systems of norms such as the one described above. Instructional
situations are content-specific in two regards: They accommodate or make room
for specific tasks, and they permit the exchange of work on those tasks for
specific items of knowledge. The instructional situation “doing proofs” does not
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customarily accommodate students’ work in which students produce the givens
or the ‘prove’ for a proof problem; rather, if they are ever involved in such work,
their involvement does not count as knowledge of proof. Based on our
understanding of the methodological role of proof in mathematics (Lakatos,
1976) we argue that such work (figuring out the givens or the conclusion) does
not always precede but it is often part of the work of proving in mathematics.
Is it Feasible to Change Instructional Situations?
A motivation for our work has been to understand better whether the kind of
mathematical work described above—the use of proof as a tool to know with—
could feasibly be deployed in classrooms. One way of addressing that question
focuses on the design of resources that can support that work. And some of our
instructional experiments (e.g., Herbst, 2003, 2006) have included developing
resources, including special lessons and units co-developed with teachers. In
those, problems were designed to create contexts where proving could help
students come up with an answer to the problem. Our focus on the feasibility of
that work led us not only to investigate whether proof could play a role as a tool
to know with (see Herbst, 2005) but also to investigate what kinds of disruptions
of the work of teaching those tasks would cause (Herbst, 2003) and what sorts of
negotiations a teacher needed to make to restore a sense of normalcy (Herbst,
2006).
Another way of addressing the feasibility question goes beyond investigating
what is possible when teachers use different tasks to engage students in proving
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and taps into the source of arguments that teachers could draw upon to justify or
rebuff such tasks. Behind that version of the feasibility question is the
fundamental hypothesis that classrooms are complex systems where actions are
not merely a projection of the will or capacity of the actors or the richness of their
resources. Rather, actions of individual actors contribute to the deployment of a
joint activity system whose performance also feeds back, and thus gives shape, to
the actions that the participants can take in that system. And at least tacitly and
as a group, teachers of a given course know the demands of that system to the
point that we should be well advised to canvass that knowledge if we intend to
understand whether a particular improvement will be feasible or not. The
question then is not simply how to design materials that enable desirable
mathematical work or how to create in teachers the desire to promote that work.
We also need to ask about the structure and function of the activity system where
that work might be deployed and how this system might accommodate or resist
attempts to deploy that work. In particular this requires thinking of mathematics
instruction in school classrooms as a system of relationships that are deployed
under various conditions and constraints. A conceptualization of this system
could enable us to think in a more sophisticated and potentially accurate way
about what teacher and students do and thus be able to foresee if given
improvement efforts have a prospect of success.
An analogy with how mathematics educators have evolved in their thinking
about students’ errors can illuminate this conceptualization of instruction as a
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system. There used to be a time when student errors were seen as indications of
misfit, mishaps, or forgetfulness. Things changed when research on students’
mathematical work started to be treated within a cognitive paradigm. For
example, an international study led by Lauren Resnick, Pearla Nesher, and
François Leonard (see Resnick, Nesher, Leonard, Magone, Omanson, & Peled,
1989) on students’ sorting of decimal fractions showed that students’ errors had a
conceptual basis: Their errors could be explained by the existence of conceptual,
tacit controls such as the “fraction rule” or the “natural number rule.” These
were mathematical quasi-truths, or epistemological obstacles (Brousseau, 1997),
true within a limited domain but false when that domain was extended. Students
that made errors did so not out of the lack of knowledge but out of the
possession of some knowledge. As a field, our stance toward students’ errors
thus changed from an early judgment stance to a later inquiry stance: Rather
than judging students as irrational when they make errors, we now strive to
understand what rationality leads them to make those errors.
We propose that we should think of the actions of teachers (and students) in
the classroom by analogy with how we have come to think about error in
children’s mathematical thinking. The analogy we propose is that we could think
of “error” in instruction—really teaching that deviates from what might be
deemed desirable—not as an indication of misfit, ill will, or lack of knowledge,
on the part of the practitioner. Rather, we should think of this “error” as an
indication of the possible presence of some knowledge, knowledge of what to do,
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which is subject to a practical rationality that justifies it. This is a rationality that
we should try to understand better before judging teachers or attempting to
legislate their practice. It is this rationality, rather than simple stubbornness, that
explains why many reforms are not able to make their way into classrooms.
Teachers and students act in classrooms in ways that attest to the existence of
specialized knowledge of what to do; knowledge that outsiders to those
classrooms are less likely to have even if they know the knowledge domain being
taught and learned. For example, as it relates to the scenario narrated above,
teachers and students of geometry would likely see it as strange for Mr. Jones to
ask the students for the givens of the problem. We focus here on the rationality
associated with the role of the teacher and how this might warrant or refute
actions like that one.
Practical Rationality and the Role of the Teacher
The “teacher” of a specific course of mathematical studies, such as high
school geometry, is an institutional role, not just a name to describe an aspect of
an individual’s identity (Buchmann, 1986). There is a person who plays the role,
for sure; that person comes to play the role with personal assets that are likely to
matter in what he or she chooses to do. These assets are likely to include
mathematical knowledge for teaching and skill at doing some tasks of teaching
(Ball, Thames, and Phelps, 2008). It is widely believed that those assets make a
difference; that teachers who have those assets may be able to figure out and do
things that others may not be able to do. But while teachers’ causes and motives
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to do things may have personal grounds, it is unlikely that their actions could be
justified on personal grounds. One could imagine that Mr. Jones in the scenario
above might have been bored with the prospect of giving his students another
routine proof exercise or wanted to have a fun day teaching geometry. But we
could not really expect him to use any of that as the warrant for doing what he
did—his job is not to find activities that amuse him, but rather to teach geometry
to his students. Even if the actual basis for his actions had been his own
amusement, how could he justify having done that when talking with his peers?
Those grounds for justification are what we call practical rationality.
The notion of practical rationality points to a container of dispositions that
could have currency in a collective, for example, within the set of colleagues who
teach geometry in similar settings. These are dispositions to abide by the norms of
the specific instructional situation a teacher is engaged in (i.e., the norms of the
situation of doing proofs in high school geometry) as well as dispositions to
honor the obligations to the profession of mathematics teaching.
By dispositions we mean what Bourdieu (1998) describes as the categories of
perception and appreciation that compel agents in a practice to act in specific
ways. We interpret categories of perception to include the taken as shared ways
in which practitioners perceive people, events, things, and ideas in the shared
world of the classroom, as instantiated, for example in the language tokens they
use to talk about the world of the classroom. We interpret categories of
appreciation to include the principles and qualities on which practitioners rely to
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establish an attitude toward people, events, things, or ideas. Dispositions tend to
be tacit but they can be articulated to others when justifying to one’s peers (or to
other stakeholders) why one might or might not do something like what Mr.
Jones did with that proof problem. The high school geometry course and the
work of doing proofs, in particular, have been particularly fertile grounds for us
to develop theory about instruction and the practical rationality of mathematics
teaching.
Didactical Contract and the Role of the Teacher
To conceptualize the work of the teacher as the playing of a role, we start
from the notion of the didactical contract (Brousseau, 1997): The hypothesis that
student and teacher have some basic roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis a body of
knowledge at stake. What does it mean that there is knowledge at stake? The
relationship between teacher and students exists because of the assumption that
there is knowledge that can be communicated from one to the other; this
knowledge is at stake because such communication may or may not happen. The
didactical contract is a tacit assignment of rights and responsibilities between
teacher and student vis-à-vis the communication of that knowledge. These
responsibilities include the expectation for the teacher to give students work to
do that is supposed to create opportunities to learn elements of that body of
knowledge, and the expectation for the student to engage in the work assigned,
producing work that can be assessed as evidence of having (or not yet having)
acquired that knowledge.

Herbst & Chazan
We use the word norm to designate each of those statements that an observer
makes in an effort to articulate what regulates a practice: Actors act as if they held
such statement as a norm, though they may be quite unaware of it. Each class has
a didactical contract that can be modeled by listing its norms. From the
perspective of the teacher, the didactical contract authorizes a basic exchange
economy of knowledge that he or she has to manage: An exchange between
work designed for, assigned to, and completed by students and elements of
knowledge, prescribed by the curriculum, at stake in that work, and hopefully
embodied in students’ productions. The role of the teacher includes managing
those exchanges between work and knowledge. This management includes, first,
enabling and supporting mathematical work; and second, interpreting the results
of this work, exchanging it for the knowledge at stake.
The hypothesis of a didactical contract only says that a contract exists that
fulfills those goals; the hypothesis means to describe any mathematics teaching
inside an educational institution. But it is also obvious that the teacher and
student roles and responsibilities are under-described by that hypothesis: There
are many ways in which the didactical contract could be enacted that would
have at least those characteristics; contracts could be quite different from each
other not the least because the mathematics at stake could be very different from
course to course and thus require very different forms of work to be learned.
Even for the same course of studies, say high school geometry, different contracts
could further stipulate the roles and responsibilities of teacher and student
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differently. In particular, it is conceivable that some contracts might include the
expectation that every new task would require negotiation about how the
general norms of the contract apply (e.g., What is it required of the teacher to get
students to work on a particular task? What does it mean for students to work on
that task?). It is also conceivable, and we argue more likely, that contracts rely on
a manifold of instructional situations that forego the need for some of those
negotiations much of the time. These instructional situations include mostly tacit
but specific norms that specify how the didactical contract applies for a range of
tasks and the specific items of knowledge to be exchanged for the students’ work
on those tasks.
While some research has endeavored to conceptualize, enact, and study the
characteristics of alternative contracts (e.g., Chazan, 2000; Lampert, 1990, 2001;
Yackel & Cobb, 1996), the first author has been interested in using a variety of
approaches to study the usual high school geometry contract and the practical
rationality behind the teachers’ work managing the exchanges enabled by that
contract. The reason for that is founded on the considerations about
improvement made earlier. Sustainable improvement in instruction will not only
need to provide new and better resources but also to be able to deal
constructively with the inertia and possible reactions from established practice.
Knowledge of how instruction usually works and what rationality underpins its
usual operations is key for the design of reforms that are viable and sustainable.
Furthermore, knowledge of how usual instruction works can encourage
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piecemeal, incremental changes that don’t throw the proverbial baby with the
bathwater.
Instructional Situations and the Role of the Teacher
The situation of “doing proofs” has been a useful starting point in that
research agenda. Historical analysis (Herbst, 2002b; González & Herbst, 2006)
has showed how the general skill “how to do proofs” became an object of study
in and of itself, leaving behind the important relationships between proofs and
specific concepts, theorems, and theories. The work that students do has also
evolved to the current state in which what a student can prove from available
givens matters much less than whether and how well they carry out a proof. In
exchange for a claim on that knowledge (to show that they know “how to do
proofs”) students are to show that they can connect a “given” with a “prove” by
making a sequence of statements justified with prior knowledge (regardless of
the strength or the importance of the proposition proved): In other words
students are learning the logical form of proof at the expense of its
methodological function. In describing such exchange as an instructional
situation, we posit that this exchange is facilitated by a specialized set of norms
that elaborate how the didactical contract applies.
From observing work in geometry classrooms we have noted that implicit
expectations of who is to do what and when vary depending on the specifics of
the object of study. In relation to diagrams, for example, the extent to which
students can draw objects into a diagram or draw observations from a diagram

TME, vol8, no.3, p .435
varies according to whether the work is framed as a construction, an exploration,
or a proof (Herbst, 2004). While the didactical contract for a course may have
some general norms that differentiate it from a contract for a different course,
there is also differentiation between the more specific norms within a given
course of studies, depending again on what is at stake. Much of those rules are
cued in classroom interaction through the use of selected words such as prove,
construct, or conjecture. These words frame classroom interaction by summoning
special, mutual expectations, or norms, of who can do what and when. As noted
above, we use the expression instructional situation to refer to each of those
frames. Instructional situations are specialized, local versions of the didactical
contract that frame particular exchanges of work for knowledge, obviating the
need to negotiate how the contract applies for a specific chunk of work.
“Doing proofs” is an example of an instructional situation in high school
geometry; “solving equations” is an example of an instructional situation in
algebra I (Chazan & Lueke, 2009). We contend that these frames for classroom
interaction, these instructional situations, are defaults for classroom interaction,
tacit knowledge held by the classroom as an organization (Cook & Brown, 1999)
that specifies what to do; knowledge perpetuated through socialization (and
with the aid of textbooks and colleagues) that, in particular, provides cues for the
teacher on what to do and what to expect the student to do. Instructional
situations are sociotechnical units of analysis; they organize joint action with
specific content.
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Our perspective centers on the situation rather than the individual and has
the power to explain why the same individual might happen to do quite
different things in different situations by no fault of their own. To implement this
focus on the situations thus far we have created models of those situations. A
model is not a portrait of what is desirable but rather a simplified operational
description of a reality, in this case a human activity. Our models consist of
arrays of norms that describe each situation in terms of who has to do what and
when (Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008). Those models facilitate research on the
content of practical rationality.
Practical rationality is a container whose content includes the categories of
perception and appreciation that are viable within the profession of mathematics
teaching to warrant (or refute) courses of action in teaching. The notions of
instructional situation, norm, and breach of a norm are the points of departure to
study this rationality empirically. Based on the ethnomethodological notion of a
breaching experiment (Mehan & Wood, 1975) we propose, as a methodological
hypothesis, that if participants in an instructional situation are immersed in an
instance of a situation where one of its norms has been breached, they will
engage in repair strategies that not only confirm the existence of the norm but
also elaborate on the role that the norm plays in the situation or on what might
justify departing from the norm.
Our data collection technique relies on representations of breached instances
of instructional situations—representations made in videos, slideshows, or comic
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strips, sometimes using real teachers and students (e.g., Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009)
or using cartoon characters (Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011). We confront
usual participants in an instructional situation with a breached representation.
For example, the classroom scenario narrated above is quite close in content to an
animated classroom story, “A Proof about Rectangles,” that we produced in
order to study the rationality behind the tacit norm that the teacher is in charge
of spelling out the givens and the prove. To find out about that rationality we
attend to participants’ reactions to the representation: Do they perceive the
breach of the norm? Do they accept the situation in spite of the breach? What do
they identify as being at risk because of the breach? What opportunities, if any,
do they see being created or lost because of the breach?
Our aim is not to understand the participants themselves; our aim is to use
the participants’ experience with the situation to understand the situation better.
In particular we want to discover the elements of the practical rationality of
mathematics teaching that teachers consider viable justifications of breaches of
situations that would arguably be desirable, say because they might create a
more authentic kind of mathematical work (see Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2009). In
the case of the story narrated above we would pose the following concrete
question: On what account could a teacher justify (or rebuff) an action like the
one Mr. Jones took? Clearly, researchers might be able to justify Mr. Jones’ action
and we have tried to articulate that from a mathematical perspective. But in spite
of the fact that some of us have had experience teaching we don’t know teaching
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now in the way practitioners do. By virtue of the role that they play and the
position from which they take on that role, teachers have to respond to specific
obligations that shape their decisions.
Experimentation and Teachers’ Responses to a Breach of a Norm
In the previous section we noted that our technique to study the practical
rationality with which practitioners might justify abiding by or departing from a
norm in an instructional situation consists in creating a representation of practice
that instantiates the situation and where the norm in question has been breached,
then listening to how teachers respond to that representation. When teachers
respond to a breach in an instructional situation, they might reject the situation
or might repair the situation. By reject the situation we mean that they would
come across as saying “this class is not doing a proof;” key in such a
categorization is (1) the recognition that someone might argue that the target
situation (doing proofs) describes the scenario being enacted and (2) their denial
of the validity of such a description. By repair the situation we mean a softer
version of rejection: participants come across as describing the events using a
different situation or as conforming to a contract different than the normative.
For example, some teachers have said that Mr. Jones is leading students in an
exploration rather than a proof.
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“the only thing I could see him doing is that he was trying to get them the
idea of making conjectures, okay? What, what can we assume about this
picture” (ITH062806, 4, 81, Tina)2
“Maybe it's just like a -- kind of a like a blank canvas for just discussing
without all of the restrictions tied on at this point just y'know lighter form
of conversation y'know.” (ThEMaT082206, 10, 109, Lucille)
Key in categorizing those expressions as repairs of the situation are that (1)
participants are describing the events in terms of the larger grain size of the
teacher’s instructional goal and that (2) participants are using some conventional
labels for recurrent classroom activity to describe what happened in ways that
fail to recognize the situation as one of “doing proofs” (e.g., conversation,
making conjectures).
A third alternative, also present in our data, can be described as
participants’ acceptance of the situation, namely recognized it as a case of “doing
proofs.” For the sake of coding data, whenever participants don’t reject or repair
the situation we take that as an acceptance, even if this is tacit. In some of these
cases their acceptance of the situation came with comments that indicated that
something about the particular task in which “doing proofs” was embodied had
not been done as it should have been done. For example, some of our
participants said

References to session data follow the convention (sessionid, interval, turn, speaker).
All names are pseudonyms.

2
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“So the fact that he's y'know not marking anything and asking them to
kinda trust that drawing is kind of odd” (ThEMaT082206, 20,227, Edwin)
“we tell them not to assume anything that we draw.” (ThEMaT082206,
5,112,Tina)
Among those comments accepting the situation as doing proofs, some comments
indicated a positive appraisal of what the teacher had done. For example:
“In the books we always go given-prove, right? So we don't really give
them the option to even explore some of the nature of the figures.”
(ThEMaT082206, 10,116, Jillian)
We describe those responses as accepting the situation (the participant identifies
or at least does not deny that the goal of the activity is to “do a proof”) but
repairing the task (while the participant does not cast the situation as different
than doing proofs, the participant recognizes some actions as deviating from the
norm in that situation). A complete enumeration of contingencies includes, at
least conceptually, the possibility that participants may accept the situation and
accept the task: However, empirically one might observe those cases to be
unmarked (e.g., the participant talks about something other than the breach).
Incidentally, note that in this discussion we are proceeding rather globally and
omitting considerations of the possible complexities of the unit of analysis for the
sake of proposing how the experimental data could be aggregated: While the
present considerations might be used to examine data gathered from individual
practitioners providing a one-time response to a representation (for example,
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responding to a multimedia questionnaire), data gathered from groups of
practitioners in more extended conversations (such as those reported by Chazan
& Herbst, 2012, or Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011) require more sophisticated
considerations of the unit of analysis.
From those broad considerations about the way we might code data from
practitioners’ responses to a representation of an instructional situation we can
anticipate a way of using this data to gauge the extent to which a hypothesized
norm pertains to the situation under consideration—and in that way use
experimentation to build basic knowledge about the practice of mathematics
teaching. Consider first the case of practitioners responding to a representation
of an instructional situation in which a hypothesized norm of that situation has
been breached (e.g., the teacher asks students to provide the givens for a proof
exercise). Consider further that the encounter between practitioners and
representations is framed for them as a case of the situation (e.g., the instrument
declares something to the effect of “we are going to see how a class works on a
proof”) but no mention is made of the possibility that a norm might be breached
nor is attention explicitly directed to the actions by which the breach is manifest.
After the encounter, participants are asked to comment on how appropriately the
teacher handled the situation (e.g., “what do you think of the way the teacher
managed the class’s engagement in proving”). The data is then coded in ways
that permit the aggregation shown in the contingency table below (and drawing
on the definitions of reject, repair, and accept given above).
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Accept Situation

Reject

or

Repair

Situation
Reject or Repair Task

2

1

Accept Task

4

3

The hypothesis that the norm breached is a norm for the situation being
represented would justify the expectation that data would aggregate in cells 2
and 3. Cell 2 represents responses of the kind ‘in this situation you’d rather do
this other work instead’ (e.g., if you want students to do a proof, you give them
the givens and the prove). Cell 3 represents responses of the kind ‘the kind of
work you are doing there fits better in this other kind of situation’ (e.g., a
question like that would be better off in a conversation than in a proof). Data that
could be classified in any of those cells would provide evidence that adds
credibility to the hypothesis that the norm applies. (Note that this evidence could
but would not solely include repairs that specifically mention the norm
breached—norms could stay tacit in spite of being breached and the evidence
provided by participants might just reveal their sense that something has gone
awry.) In contrast, cells 1 and 4 provide evidence that contradicts or at least
provides no evidence in favor of the normative nature of the hypothesized norm.
Intuitively, under the hypotheses that the norm applies to the situation, that
the representation breaches the norm, and that the participants are experienced

TME, vol8, no.3, p .443
enactors of the situation, one would expect the aggregate of Cells 2 and 3 (repairs
of situation or of task) to be higher than the aggregate of Cells 1 and 4. One could
define a measure of the extent to which the representation elicits repairs (2 + 3)
or percentage of teachers who repaired over those who provided comments..
More generally, given a representation (related to a norm N of a situation S) and
a sample of practitioners, the representation could be classified a priori as
breaching or non breaching N, and each practitioner could be classified as
experienced or not experienced in S. The percentages of repairs could be used in
particular, to test (this time using the modern sense of experiment) the extent to
which experienced practitioners in a situation hold norm N.
Imagine a sample of experienced practitioners randomly assigned to one of
the following two conditions. In the experimental condition the practitioners
consider a breached representation, while in the control condition the
practitioners consider a compliant representation.

The responses from

practitioners would then be summarized in corresponding repair ratios r1,e and
r0,e as defined above and the difference between these proportions could be
tested for significance. Similarly, one could pose the question of whether this
norm is significantly more salient for teachers experienced in the situation of
interest than for teachers who do not have such experience. This question could
lead one to compare the ratios r1,1 and r1,0, that is, the repair ratios for
experienced and non experienced practitioners confronting a breached
representation. Finally, one could consider randomly assigning practitioners who
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are either experienced or inexperienced in the situation to either a breached or a
compliant representation, and analyzing the table of contingencies below. The
Chi Square test could be used to examine whether acknowledgment of Norm N
is specific to teachers experienced in Situation S.
Experienced in S

Inexperienced in S

Breached Representation (of NS) r1,1

r1,0

Compliant Representation (of S) r0,1

r0,0

Of course the preceding argument is only a sketch of what the research ahead
requires. In addition to the problem of determining the unit of analysis noted
above, there remains the problem of finding operational ways of determining
repairs, rejections, and acceptances of task and situation. While we have made
some important progress identifying norms of situations to be researched and
creating representations that breach those norms, the work of developing
measures of the repairs that practitioners produce in response to those
representations is still incipient. Our current work in this area investigates the
use of elements of systemic functional linguistics, particularly the notions of
modality and appraisal (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Martin & White, 2007), to
anchor the notion of repair in linguistic performance. Furthermore, as far as the
implementation of the technique, these considerations oversimplify the certainty
with which one can say that a representation of a situation breaches a norm or
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complies with all norms—it isn’t only that the provisional nature of models
challenges the extent to which one can ever say that a representation will be
compliant, but the multidimensional and interactive nature of human activity
makes it hard to represent breaches of a norm without other remarkable
entailments needed for continuity’s sake. Along those lines, and because of the
extent to which an instance of a situation may instantiate more than the actions
specific to a norm, a third challenge consists of being able to reproduce the
phenomenon (participants’ recognition of the norm) independently of the
representation used: Would representations R and R’ of different instances of the
same situation S, each of which breaches the same norm N, produce similar
responses

from

practitioners

experienced

in

S?

Considering

those

methodological challenges, it is fitting to say that so far we have only been able
to show how our theoretical agenda and basic research goals could use an
experimental paradigm and within that to indicate more specific methodological
goals.
The sketch above does indicate a path for using an experimental approach in
basic research on mathematics teaching—specifically, research that identifies and
confirms the existence of specific norms for specific instructional situations. But
as noted above, practical rationality includes more than the norms of
instructional situations; it includes the categories of perception and appreciation
with which practitioners can relate to actual and possible actions in teaching. In
particular, practical rationality includes the grounds on which a breach of a norm
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might be recognized as a breach and yet appraised favorably. Notwithstanding
the possible use of the experimental design sketched above to test hypotheses, it
is probably just as important for theory and practice to deepen the descriptive
research that can lead to more refined hypotheses, especially hypotheses that can
account for the difference between justifiable and unjustifiable breaches of
norms.
Practical Rationality and the Justifications for Breaches of Norms
The data that we collect from practitioners in response to breached
representations usually contains more than repairs of those breaches.
Practitioners not only recognize the presence of a norm when they repair its
breach, quite often they do so using discourse that commits a stance toward such
a breach. Those stances are not always negative; when these stances are positive,
practitioners may engage in a rather visible practical argument to justify an
action in spite of the norm against it. As part of the agenda to flesh out the
content of practical rationality we are interested in inventorying and accounting
for the dispositions used by practitioners to warrant actions that breach norms
(as well as those actions that comply with norms).
Sometimes, teachers’ responses to breaches of a norm may indict the
teacher for breaching a norm and justify it with an argument that explicates why
the norm exists. In the case presented above, the evidence we found suggests
that the norm of providing the given and the “prove” may be justified on the
grounds that it keeps students from making knowledge claims by relying on the
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looks of a diagram. Indeed the line between, on the one hand, assuming
something as given so as to start drawing necessary consequences from it and, on
the other hand, assuming something else as true while one is drawing those
consequences, may be blurry enough to justify keeping students from having to
manage it. One could represent this argument for a norm by adapting Toulmin’s
(1969; see also Inglis, Mejía-Ramos, & Simpson, 2007) argument layout, as shown
in Figure 4 (where instead of data and claim we use circumstances and action
respectively).

Figure 4. A practical argument using Toulmin’s layout.

The data also shows that teachers’ responses sometimes acknowledge the breach,
but rather than indicting the teacher for the breach they might justify it while
relaying whatever reasons they might have for that justification. In this sense, the
breaching experiments give access to other elements of the practical rationality of
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mathematics teaching. In the data shown above, one of the comments appeared
to justify the breach by elaborating on the grounds for exception noted above.

Figure 5. A practical argument for and against an action using Toulmin’s layout.

The Norms and Obligations that Span Practical Rationality
From our work in the past five years, looking at the responses from teachers
to animations that represent breaches of situations in geometry and algebra, we
have built an initial model of this practical rationality. In this model, conceivable
moves by a teacher are justified or rebuffed on the basis of principles or warrants
that attest to the presence of two sets of regulatory elements. One of those sets of
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regulatory elements describes the roles the teacher is called to play in the
contract, the instructional situations, or in mathematical tasks. As noted above,
we call all of those norms: Some are norms of the contract (they regulate work
across the many objects of knowledge in a course of studies), while others are
norms of the instructional situation (they regulate work that is specific to an
object of knowledge). A third kind of norms, norms of the task (regulating how
the teacher supports the milieu for the students’ mathematical task) is also part
of the model but is not discussed here (see Herbst, 2003; also Brousseau, 1997).
The other set of regulations, which we explicate below, includes the professional
obligations that tie an individual to the position of mathematics teacher, beyond
the specific demands of a particular contract, situation, or task.
In general, the first set of regulations for actions in teaching come from the
structure of the different ‘games’ the teacher and the student play with specific
content. The various norms that justify teachers’ actions respond to the
requirements of the role the teacher is called to play in the contract for a course of
studies, the situation that frames the different kinds of work that exchange for a
particular object of knowledge, and a specific mathematical task. But these norms
by themselves don’t explain why practitioners see some breaches of norms as
acceptable (see, for example, Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009; Herbst, Nachlieli, &
Chazan, 2011). The data that we have gathered shows not only that the norm
exists and what problems it would help solve, but also on what grounds it could
be breached. As we analyze the data from study groups that considered the
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many animations we created in ThEMaT, a more systematic way of accounting
for those warrants has become useful to us.
Both the presence of norms and the breaches of norms can be accounted for
by appeal to various professional obligations that we posit apply to the
mathematics teacher (to some extent these obligations may also apply to the
elementary teacher who teaches mathematics part of their time, but they likely
need to be adapted). We propose that four professional obligations can organize
the justifications (or refutations) that participants might give to actions that
depart from a situational (or contractual) norm. We call these four obligations
disciplinary, individual, interpersonal, and institutional (Herbst & Balacheff, 2009;
see also Ball, 1993).
The disciplinary obligation says that the mathematics teacher is obligated to
steward a valid representation of the discipline of mathematics. This may include
the obligation to steward representations of mathematical knowledge,
mathematical practices, and mathematical applications.
The individual obligation says that a teacher is obligated to attend to the well
being of the individual student. This may include being obligated to attend to
individual students’ identities and to their behavioral, cognitive, emotional, or
social needs.
The interpersonal obligation says that the teacher is obligated to share and
steward their medium of interaction with other human beings in the classroom.

TME, vol8, no.3, p .451
This may include attending to the needs and resources of shared discursive,
physical, and social spaces within shared time.
And the institutional (schooling) obligation says that the teacher is obligated to
observe various aspects of the schooling regime. These include attending to
school policies, calendars, schedules, examinations, curriculum, extra curricular
activities, and so on.
These obligations are not specific to a contract for a course of studies; they
describe equally the teacher of AP Calculus and the teacher of informal
geometry. They coalesce to justify contracts and their instructional situations;
and they may combine with norms of contract, situation, or task in order to
justify extraordinary actions. In general, combined with the norms of contracts,
situations, and tasks these obligations span the practical rationality of
mathematics teaching. The dispositions that compose practical rationality could
be accounted for as combinations of norms and obligations. One can then say
that the justifications for actions in teaching, either those actions that are usual or
those that are unusual but viable, can be found by combining norms of the
contract and situations that the teacher is enacting with obligations the teacher
has to the profession of mathematics teaching.
Within that rationality one can see specific contracts (high school geometry,
algebra I) and their instructional situations (doing proofs, solving equations) as
sociohistorical constructions that have persisted over time by complying in some
way with those obligations. To the extent that the obligations could contradict
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each other, it is quite an accomplishment for teaching to have been able to
develop stable contracts and situations over time (Herbst, 2002a).
Conclusion: Practical Rationality and Instructional Improvement
The theory of practical rationality is a way of accounting for existing, stable
practices. To the extent that our interest in improving practice stresses the need
for improvements to be responsible, incremental, and sustainable, it is
appropriate for us to try to understand what justifies the norms of stable
contracts and situations, even if we might want to modify or do away with some
of them: Understanding stable systems of practices as well as understanding how
those systems react to perturbations is fundamental for the design of new
practices. Indeed, since improved practices will need to subject themselves to
similar grounds for justification, practices that are close to those that are normal
in existing instructional situations (as gauged by how many norms of a situation
a practice breaches) may be easier to justify than others.
The theory also provides the means for the researcher to anticipate how
instruction may respond to new practices: A novel task such as “what is
something interesting that could be proved about the object in Figure 1” conjures
up by resemblance one or more instructional situations (e.g., “doing proofs” and
“exploration”) as possible frames for the work to be done. Models of those
situations provide the researcher with a baseline of norms that could be breached
as the work proceeds. Researchers can then use the obligations to anticipate what
kinds of reactions teachers may have to the enactment those breaches. This
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anticipation can be useful in examining the potential derailments in the
implementation of new practices in classrooms. That anticipation may also be
useful in the examination of teachers’ responses to assessments or development,
or their reactions to instructional interventions.
Thus the theory provides not only the basis for the design of probes for the
rationality of teaching (Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008) but also a framework for an
analysis of the reactions from participants. Combined with finer tools from
discourse analysis (e.g., Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) teachers’ responses to
representations of breaching (but arguably valuable) instances of an instructional
situation can help us understand not only what justifies teaching as it exists
today but also whether and how proposed new practices could be justified in
ways that practitioners find compelling.
Along these lines, the theory also provides a framework for teacher
development. This framework puts a premium on the teachers’ noticing of
actions in teaching, their consideration of alternative actions, and the
consideration of justifications for those different actions. The various tools we
have created, which include not only the animations and the cartoon characters
but also software to create scenarios with them, software to annotate the
scenarios individually or in forums, and software to author online sessions3 that

3

A dedicated software tool enables teacher educators to create an agenda for users to
interact with representations of practice (e.g., videos, images), prompts and questions,
and tools for the user to interact with the media (e.g., annotating, marking moments, etc.)
and with each other.
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use the materials, can be useful in implementing this development program.4 It is
important to note that at the core of these developments there is a theory of
teaching and its rationality that accounts for the teaching that is customarily seen
in classrooms: At its base the theory attempts to be descriptive and explanatory
rather than axiological or prescriptive. This is particularly visible in our
identification of the obligations: We posit the institutional obligation in all its
strength not necessarily out of advocacy for it but out of our recognition that
practitioners are obligated to it regardless of anybody’s feelings about it.
The theory does identify mechanisms for exploring empirically teaching that
might be conceivable and desirable: The notions of situation, norm, breach,
repair, and obligation can help examine a priori attempts to improve teaching
and examine a posteriori the data from implementation. In that sense, the theory
can support the piecemeal exploration of instructional improvement. The theory
is a basic theory of mathematics instruction, a basic account of the activity of
teaching mathematics in the school classroom—not an applied theory that
reduces that phenomenon to the psychology of individual teachers. The
psychology of mathematics teachers may still be useful to inform what enables
and motivates individual teachers to do things, but the logic of action in
mathematics teaching addressed by practical rationality may help us understand
why some of those actions can be responsible, viable, and sustainable.

4

These tools and content, including examples of these learning experiences are available
at www.lessonsketch.org
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An important limitation of the theory in its current formulation is that it does
not quite incorporate an explicit account of learning5 either by students or by
teachers. Indeed the theory described above represents instruction as composed
of stable patches of specific practices (contracts, situations, and tasks) and one
might conclude that the theory describes only how knowledge is used by
students and attested by teachers. Building on situated and socio-cultural
accounts of learning and practice (e.g., Engestrom, 1992; Wenger, 1999) we
contend that learning (by students and by the teacher) is accomplished in and
through their practice in contracts, situations, and tasks. Additionally, the notion
that contracts and situations can be breached by tasks that fall outside the norms
of a situation or a contract is key in describing how the teacher might promote
adaptive learning deliberately; and it has been foundational for Brousseau’s
(1997) theory of didactical situations. An explicit account of how this theory of
instructional practice interfaces or complements accounts of student and teacher
learning is needed and it remains a goal as we move ahead.

We appreciate Ron Tzur’s comment to this effect in the occasion of the first author’s
plenary lecture at the 2010 PME-NA Conference.
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